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neglect them. As the crisis worsened, the
steel industry and the United Steel Work-
ers of America (USWA) pressed the Bush
administration to make good on its cam-
paign promise.
In response, President Bush launched
a three-pronged steel strategy in June
2001. The first prong sought to address
global excess steel capacity. The second
prong sought an end to subsidies and
other market-distorting practices. These
two prongs have been pursued under the
auspices of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD).
The third prong was a Section 201 in-
vestigation to determine whether “safe-
guards” should be imposed against 33
types of steel imports. In October 2001,
the US International Trade Commission
(ITC) made affirmative or evenly divided
determinations that 16 of the 33 types of
steel “are being imported into the United
States in such increased quantities that
they were a substantial cause of serious
injury or threat of serious injury” to US
steel producers.2 In contrast to the require-
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Background
While the US steel industry has been
in distress for decades, the “steel crisis” of
1999-2001 was particularly acute. More
than 30 steel producing and steel process-
ing firms fell into bankruptcy between
1997 and 2001, and most of the failures
occurred after President Bush took office.1
During his presidential campaign, Bush
promised steelworkers that he would not
1. For a list of bankruptcies, see USWA (2002).
2. Under US law, evenly divided determinations
(covering 4 types of steel) are tantamount to
affirmative injury findings. See USITC (2002a) for
the official ITC determinations.
On balance, US steel policy
in 2001 and 2002 has not
been nearly as helpful
to the US steel industry
as partisans hoped.     January 2003 PB03-1 2
ments for an antidumping or a countervailing duty
case, a safeguard investigation requires no demon-
stration that steel imports are sold unfairly. In De-
cember 2001, the commissioners gave their remedy
recommendations to President Bush—remedies that
took the form of tariffs, quotas, or tariff-rate quotas
(TRQs) against the injurious imports.
In March 2002, President Bush chose to impose
tariffs against 14 of the 16 products found by the
ITC to be injuring the domestic steel industry.3 Presi-
dent Bush imposed 30 percent tariffs on flat steel
products, hot-rolled bars, and cold-finished bars, and
tariffs up to 15 percent on other steel products.  On
steel slabs (unfinished steel that is processed in US
integrated mills to make flat steel products), Presi-
dent Bush adopted a TRQ: all imports in excess of 6
million short tons are subject to a tariff of 30 per-
cent, but all slab imports up to 6 million short tons
face no additional duty.4 The safeguard remedies are
scheduled to be phased down each year and abol-
ished completely after March 2005.
Canada, Mexico, and other countries that have
preferential trade agreements with the United States
are excluded from the Section 201 remedies, as are
developing countries whose steel imports fall below
a de minimis threshold.5 In 2000, the United States
imported 32.1 million short tons of steel, of which
only 29 percent (9.3 million short tons) were subject
to the safeguard tariffs levied by President Bush in
March 2002. The remaining 71 percent were cov-
ered by ITC findings of no injury or by initial coun-
try exclusions.6
This policy brief reviews the good, the bad, and
the ugly dimensions of US steel policy in 2001 and
2002. On balance, the policy has not been nearly as
helpful to the US steel industry as partisans hoped.
At the same time, it is not nearly as bad as some
steel consumers and foreign exporters may have
feared. Nevertheless, the policy should be dramati-
cally changed in the coming months to avoid poten-
tially ugly consequences. In this policy brief, we of-
fer recommendations geared both toward averting
the ugly consequences and toward achieving a last-
ing solution to the problems that beset the steel
industry.
The Good—Global Trade Liberalization Is
Progressing
President Bush’s decision to protect the US steel
industry with Section 201 tariffs had no economic
justification. Before relief was granted, we calculated
that safeguard tariffs would cost over $400,000 an-
nually per job saved in the steel industry.7 More-
over, they would result in net job losses in the
economy due to downstream layoffs, which is why
most of President Bush’s economic advisers ex-
pressed their opposition.
Few could argue that the US steel industry was
not distressed, but objective observers certainly ques-
tioned whether trade was the problem and whether
trade protection was the right solution. The
administration’s steel tariffs were driven not by an
economic match between problems and solutions but
by two political motivations. The first was the noble
goal of passing Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) in
Congress; the second was the less noble goal of buy-
ing the steel industry’s support in congressional and
presidential elections.
President Bush’s steel decision had international
ramifications. Foreign steel exporters and their gov-
ernments threatened retaliation, which could have
soured the atmosphere for global and regional trade
negotiations (the Doha Round and the Free Trade
Area of the Americas). The good news is that the
steel tariffs have furthered the cause of global trade
liberalization by helping Bush obtain TPA. So far,
the negative international consequences of the steel
decision have neither led to trade retaliation nor to
a breakdown of trade negotiations.
Trade Promotion Authority
For several years, trade negotiating authority was
stalled in the House of Representatives. In Novem-
ber 1997, President Clinton and his congressional
allies, fearing a loss, pulled their trade bill from the
House floor. In September 1998, the House voted
against “fast-track” by a margin of 243 to 180. In
3. During the course of its investigation the majority of the ITC
found that plate, hot-rolled sheet and strip, cold-rolled sheet
and strip, and coated steel were a “like” product and could be
treated as a single product for the purpose of determining injury
and recommending relief. Two minority ITC commissioners
considered tin to be included in the flat product group. Thus,
some prefer to classify President Bush’s remedy as covering 11
out of 13 types of steel imports. However, we think the decision
to group the flat products is misleading and will likely be faulted
by the WTO.
4. The 6 million short-ton quota applies to non-NAFTA slab
imports only. Mexico and Canada are permitted to export an
unlimited amount of slab to the United States without triggering
tariffs. Slab imports from non-NAFTA countries were on track
as of August 2002 to approach 7.5 million short-tons in 2002,
so the 30 percent tariffs may have been triggered sometime in
the fourth quarter of 2002.
5. The steel industry is pressing the Bush administration to
revoke the exclusions of countries such as India and Turkey for
some steel products on the grounds that their exports to the US
market now exceed the de minimis  thresholds.
6. These figures come from Hillman (2002). 7. See Hufbauer and Goodrich (2002).       January 2003 PB03-1 3
December 2001, the House passed its version of TPA
(the new name for “fast track”) by a single vote; in
July 2002, the House approved the TPA conference
report by just three votes.
Several factors contributed to the successful
passage of TPA in 2002, and President Bush’s steel
policy was arguably among them. Of the 31 mem-
bers of the House who voted against TPA in 1998
and for TPA in 2001 and 2002, 10 were members of
the House Steel Caucus. No one has acknowledged
an explicit deal between the Bush administration and
Caucus members, but at a minimum the Section 201
steel investigation gave these 10 representatives “po-
litical cover” to vote for TPA. All 10 won their No-
vember 2002 elections with at least 60 percent of
the vote, so with the benefit of hindsight, they prob-
ably could have afforded to vote for TPA regardless
of the administration’s steel decisions.8 But the
administration’s actions certainly afforded these 10
Representatives comfort in the November elections.
The United States has historically resorted to
protectionist measures in order to launch or imple-
ment major trade negotiations.9 The “one step back,
two steps forward” strategy is tolerable if the protec-
tionist step backward is the minimum necessary to
obtain the larger prize. In this case the larger prize
is TPA and the resulting opportunity to complete
regional and global trade deals (the FTAA and the
Doha Round), which promise to improve US and glo-
bal welfare by hundreds of billions of dollars annu-
ally. For example, one study estimates that a 33 per-
cent reduction in world trade barriers could increase
US welfare by $177 billion annually and world wel-
fare by $613 billion annually.10
The TPA package included renewal and expan-
sion of Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA). The new
TAA provides a 65 percent tax credit for health in-
surance as well as income maintenance and job train-
ing for displaced workers. The new TAA package also
includes a wage insurance program for older work-
ers, a concept advocated in previous Institute policy
briefs.11 The 65 percent tax credit for health insur-
ance is extended to non-Medicare eligible retired
workers over the age of 55 whose pensions are ad-
ministered by the Pension Benefit Guarantee Cor-
poration owing to the bankruptcy of their former
employers. This provision to help retirees was moti-
vated by the plight of retired steel workers, and it
certainly counts among the “good” outcomes of US
steel policy. Expanded TAA benefits partly assuage
public fears about growing imports and may increase
congressional sympathy for future trade
liberalization.
Product Exclusions
As soon as President Bush announced the steel
tariffs, domestic steel consumers and foreign steel
exporters complained that they were being forced to
pay for Bush’s gift to the steel industry. Leading the
charge, the European Union and Japan publicly
threatened to retaliate against hallmark US exports
from politically sensitive congressional districts—
such as textiles from Southeast states and citrus
products from Florida—in advance of the November
2002 mid-term elections.
To deflect the foreign backlash, the administra-
tion immediately announced that it would exempt
certain items from the steel tariffs if domestic firms
were not able to produce adequate quantities of
highly similar steel goods. In practice, the product
exclusion process devolved into a balancing act: the
Bush administration tried to grant just enough prod-
uct exclusions to prevent foreign retaliation, but not
so many as to exhaust the goodwill previously gar-
8. Unofficial campaign results from CNN (2002).
9. See Bergsten (2002).
10. See Brown, Deardorff, and Stern (2001).
President Bush’s decision to
protect the US steel industry
with Section 201 tariffs
had no economic justification.
Hence if not for the product
exclusions on steel imports
subject to a 30 percent tariff
increase, an additional $233 million
worth of steel imports (between
600,000 and 700,000 short
 tons) would have been displaced
by the Section 201 remedies.
11. See Hufbauer and Goodrich (2001, 2002). The wage
insurance proposal in those policy briefs was based on the policy
brief of Kletzer and Litan (2001).      January 2003 PB03-1 4
nered with the steel industry, the USWA, and con-
gressional members of the Steel Caucus.
Some product exclusions were granted immedi-
ately, and others came in batches throughout the
summer of 2002. Altogether, the 3.5 million short
tons of exclusions granted to date cover 727 steel
products and constitute 25 percent of the tonnage
covered by Bush’s Section 201 remedy. However, it
should be noted that half the product exclusions
(measured by volume) cover unfinished steel that is
imported by integrated steel firms for further pro-
cessing.12 While product exclusions for unfinished
steel clearly are not detrimental to integrated firms,
the USWA resents the fact that its employers are
essentially outsourcing the initial stages
of production.13
We calculate that, of the steel imports that would
ordinarily be subject to a 30 percent tariff increase
in the second and third quarters of 2002, 46 per-
cent (by value) entered with a product exclusion and
faced a negligible tariff.14 Furthermore, by our cal-
culations only 31 percent of such imports can afford
to “eat” a 30 percent tariff increase. Hence if not for
the product exclusions on steel imports subject to a
30 percent tariff increase, an additional $233 mil-
lion worth of steel imports (between 600,000 and
700,000 short tons) would have been displaced by
the Section 201 remedies.
Foreign steel exporters gain much more from
product exclusions than do domestic steel consum-
ers. Some foreign steel exporters with product ex-
clusions actually benefit from the overall system of
Section 201 protection because the rest of their for-
eign competitors still face safeguard tariffs of up to
30 percent. Unlucky foreign competitors without
exclusions operate at a distinct disadvantage in the
US market. Meanwhile, US steel consumers have to
pay the going price to all steel suppliers. Lucky for-
eign steel exporters with product exclusions can
therefore raise the prices they charge US steel con-
sumers by a substantial fraction of the 30 percent
tariff and pocket the additional profits, technically
known as “quota rents.”15
US government-fostered largesse in the form of
quota rents served to appease Japanese and Euro-
pean steel producers and their governments, which
agreed to put off retaliation until after the World
Trade Organization (WTO) hears the case against the
US steel safeguards. We believe that the safeguard
tariffs will be found inconsistent with WTO standards
and thus liable to WTO-sanctioned retaliation. The
legal case, including appeals, will likely be concluded
in late 2003.
If Japan and the European Union had instead
gone ahead with immediate retaliation—citing an
ambiguous but untested provision of the WTO Agree-
ment on Safeguards—the atmosphere for further glo-
bal trade liberalization would have worsened.16 The
Bush administration deserves credit for avoiding this
outcome.
Mixed Blessings—Steel Prices and Productivity
Both Up
In this section, we examine two phenomena to
illustrate that there is no such thing as a free lunch.
First, productivity in the US steel industry has con-
12. Figures come from USTR (2002a).
13. Unfinished imports are detrimental to minimills, and Nucor
led the charge to impose 40 percent tariffs against unfinished
imports for the sole purpose of driving up the operating costs of
roller mills (a type of integrated mill that produces finished goods
by rolling imported slab), which represent an emerging threat to
minimill dominance in the steel industry.
14. See appendix A for details of this calculation. The products
that would ordinarily face a tariff increase of 30 percent are plated
steel, hot-rolled flat steel, cold-rolled steel, coated steel, tin, hot-
rolled bars and light shapes, and cold-finished steel from
countries that are subject to the remedies for these products.
Other types of steel, as well as steel imports from Canada, Mexico,
and developing countries are not considered in this calculation.
15. The CEO of POSCO, Korea’s quasi-public steel producer,
which received a 826,720 short ton exception to supply U.S.
Steel, recently said in the Chicago Tribune (2002), “I would like
to extend personal gratitude to Mr. Bush for putting in place the
steel safeguards and other initiatives,” adding that “I am
extremely skeptical that this kind of protectionist measures for
U.S. steelmakers will contribute to the industry restructuring
and reviving itself.” The tendency of protection to create quota
rents is further analyzed in Hufbauer and Wada (1999).
16. Article 8.3 of the WTO Agreement on Safeguards states: “The
right of suspension referred to in paragraph 2 shall not be
exercised for the first three years that a safeguard measure is in
effect, provided that the safeguard measure has been taken as a
result of an absolute increase in imports ...” The legal controversy
is whether affected parties are permitted to unilaterally judge
that US steel imports are not increasing in absolute terms. The
United States said “no”. The European Union and Japan said
“yes”, but agreed to refrain from retaliation due to the product
exclusions and the quota rents they enjoyed.
US tonnage consumption of steel (in-
clusive of imports) was less in 2001
than in 1964, despite the fact that the
real value of US durable goods con-
sumption increased over 150 percent
during this period.    January 2003 PB03-1 5
tinued its upward trend in 2002, which is good for
steel consumers and bad for the USWA, since the
ranks of dues-paying members get downsized. Sec-
ond, thanks in part to the Section 201 tariffs, steel
prices are up, which is good for steel producers but
bad for steel consumers.
Productivity in the US Steel Industry
Table 1 presents a snapshot of the US steel in-
dustry in 1964, 2001, and 2002. The most striking
figure is that US tonnage consumption of steel (in-
clusive of imports) was less in 2001 than in 1964,
despite the fact that the real value of US durable
goods consumption increased over 150 percent dur-
ing this period.17 The US economy is much less steel
intensive today than in previous years, and US de-
mand for steel has been essentially stagnant for four
decades. Moreover, consumption of steel is projected
to decline further in 2002, despite the moderate up-
turn in the economy relative to 2001.
At the same time, competition on the supply side
of the market has intensified dramatically, both from
foreign and domestic sources. Although integrated
steel producers and the USWA concentrate their
blame on imports, over half the decline in traditional
integrated steel production is attributable to the rise
of domestic minimills, such as Nucor and Steel Dy-
namics. Traditional integrated steel production de-
creased by 62 million short tons between 1964 and
2001, while minimill production increased by 35
million short tons.
Moreover, US integrated steel mills are the sole
importers of unfinished steel, which they further
process and sell with markups; thus, unfinished steel
imports help rather than harm integrated steel pro-
ducers. When seen in these terms, the increase in
finished steel imports (17 million short tons between
1964 and 2001)—the kind of steel imports that com-
pete with the final output of domestic mills—was
less than half the corresponding increase in minimill
production. Minimills, not imports, are the main force
crowding integrated steel firms.
The rise of minimills allows finished steel to be
made more efficiently. To cite just one statistic, each
Table 1  Snapshot of the US steel industry in 1964, 2001, and 2002






























































































1. Apparent consumption is roughly equal to [production - exports + imports], but it is technically defined as [shipments - exports + finished
imports + stock changes]. Data for shipments and stock changes are not reported here.
2. In 1964, traditional production included two types of integrated production: open hearth production and blast oxygen furnace production.
Today, all integrated mill production uses blast oxygen furnaces.
3. All steel imports in 1964 are assumed to be finished.
4. Figures are for SIC 331 and are averaged based on monthly data.
5. 2002 figures are generally projected by utilizing the appropriate year-to-date through October 2002 data from the AISI. The three exceptions
are the growth rate for apparent steel consumption, which is taken from the IISI, the growth rate for raw steel production, which was taken from
the AISI's December 2002 data and the data on production workers and weekly hours, which was taken from the BLS's December 2002 data.
Notes: USGS figures are originally reported in metric tons.  Components may not add to totals due to rounding.
Sources: USGS (2002a, 2002b) for most 1964 tonnage data; Barringer and Pierce (2000, p.260) for minimill production in 1964; AIIS (2002) for
apparent steel consumption in 2001 and 2002; BLS (2002b) for labor data; and AISI (2002a, 2002b) for other data.
17. Data for the consumption of durable goods comes from the
BEA (2002) and is deflated using the Consumer Price Index
published by the BLS (2002a).January 2003 PB03-1 6
employee in Nucor’s minimills makes three times as
many tons of steel as each employee at US Steel (the
largest integrated steel producer in the United States
and second to Nucor in absolute production).18 To
be sure, both input and output mixes differ between
the two firms, but the differences do not cancel out
the crude comparison of annual tons per worker.
Over the past four decades, Nucor has been profit-
able every year, while US Steel has often incurred
losses.
Improvements in labor productivity are good for
steel consumers, because productive firms take
market share from less productive firms by offering
better quality and reduced prices. As a result, how-
ever, less productive firms and their workers suffer
and are eventually driven out of the steel industry.
The combination of stagnant demand and rising pro-
ductivity (especially in nonunionized minimills) is the
greatest threat to the USWA—not imports.19 At cur-
rent levels of productivity and annual worker hours,
the United States could make all the steel it made in
1964 with less than 175,000 production workers,
which would increase the current production
workforce by only 30,000. If all finished steel im-
ports in 2002 were replaced with domestic produc-
tion, about 32,000 additional steel production work-
ers would be needed to fill this demand. An addi-
tional 30,000 to 32,000 production workers would
bring the total industry production workforce to the
actual number of steel production workers just two
short years ago and the increase would still be less
than one-tenth of the steel production jobs lost since
1964 (some 343,000 jobs) solely due to increases in
productivity and weekly hours.
In our previous policy brief, we predicted that a
moderate Section 201 remedy would increase the
gross number of jobs in the steel industry by a mere
3,500. The number of steel production workers in
November 2002 was the same as in February 2002
and is almost the same as the monthly average for
2002. Although it is possible that the Section 201
remedy saved some jobs by preventing further lay-
offs, we continue to be baffled by the willingness of
unionized workers to believe that protection is a great
benefit to them. When will they realize that their
union leaders wrongly vilify imports and make false
promises about the payoff from protection?
Steel Prices
The purpose of the steel safeguard was to in-
crease domestic steel prices. However, domestic
prices for some steel products rose much more than
most observers expected, prompting a campaign to
remove the tariffs in 2003. Specifically, the Motor
and Equipment Manufacturers Association got a
resolution introduced in the House that calls on
President Bush to review the steel tariffs in March
2003, six months earlier than required by US law.20
The influential National Association of Manufactur-
ers has a longstanding policy of remaining neutral
on specific protectionist measures, but in October
2001 it moved toward a position opposed to the Sec-
tion 201 tariffs by adopting this resolution—over the
strenuous objections of its steel-producing members:
Whereas a stable domestic steel industry is in the
national interest, whereas there are overriding
considerations of general importance to American
industry in having a well-functioning steel market
and whereas the recently imposed steel tariffs have
had a negative impact on steel users, we therefore
resolve that the NAM International Economic Policy
Committee should be convened to develop a policy
position on steel trade that is appropriate for all
constituencies.21
On December 11, 2002, the International Economic
Policy Committee of NAM passed a statement, which
will likely be approved by the NAM board in Febru-
ary 2003, that calls on President Bush to instruct
the ITC to conduct a study by July 31, 2003, on how
18. Based on 2001 annual reports, see US Steel (2002) and Nucor
(2002). US Steel Corporation operates a foreign mill in Slovakia,
but the Slovakian output and employees are not included in
this calculation.
19. There has been considerable discussion recently about the
value of the dollar, the effect of the exchange rate on imports,
and the health of the US manufacturing sector, particularly
industries like steel. For contrasting views on the issue, see Baily
(2002) and Blecker (2002).
20. The resolution is H. CON. RES. 507.
21. Quoted in American Metal Market (2002).
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steel tariffs have affected steel producers and steel
consumers. It may strike some as surprising that
the ITC was not required to predict how tariffs would
affect steel consumers during the Section 201 in-
vestigation, but US law does not require an impact
assessment. The proposed NAM statements also call
on President Bush to appoint a blue-ribbon panel of
outside experts to recommend a plan of action.
How much have steel prices increased in 2002,
particularly since the tariffs were imposed in March?
The answer depends on the product and the condi-
tions under which it is sold. The most commonly
cited benchmark of steel prices is the price reported
by Purchasing Magazine for hot-rolled steel sheet.
However, this is a “spot market” price and a sub-
stantial quantity of hot-rolled steel is either sold
under long-term, large-volume contracts, or “sold”
by a steel firm to itself for further processing. The
producer price index, collected by the Bureau of La-
bor Statistics (BLS), better measures movements in
the average price of hot-rolled sheets because it is
based on surveys that include all types of transac-
tions. But the producer price index does not express
the price in dollar terms, so it is often overlooked. In
figure 1, we have approximated the average price of
hot-rolled sheets by multiplying its producer price
index by a conversion factor based on publicly avail-
able data from the Section 201 investigation. While
the spot market price almost doubled in 2002 (from
$220 to $400 per ton) before declining slightly, the
average price of hot-rolled sheet based on the pro-
ducer price index increased 30 percent or about $80
per ton.
To be sure, hot-rolled sheet is only one type of
steel and many factors besides tariffs affect domes-
tic steel prices. The central question is, “How much
has the average domestic steel price increased due
to the Section 201 tariffs?” That question is difficult
to answer. Industry associations from both sides of
the steel issue have released studies on steel prices,
but neither camp has rigorously addressed the cen-
tral question.22 In our previous policy brief, we used
a partial equilibrium model to predict that the aver-
age price of domestic steel would increase 2.7 to 3.6
percent, depending on the strength of the Section
201 remedies. This estimate was in line with other
calculated estimates at the time.
Judging from the producer price index for steel
as a whole (SIC 331), the average steel price increased
Note: Average price is calculated using the Producer Price Index for hot-rolled carbon sheets and a base of $297 per ton in 2000 as
reported by the ITC.
Sources: BLS (2002), USITC (2001, p. FLAT C-4), SMA (2002), and Purchasing Magazine (2002).
Figure 1  Average price vs. spot market price of hot-rolled sheet, 1985-2002
index (year 1 =100)
22.  See Morici (2002) and Mueller (2002).       January 2003 PB03-1 8
about 8.4 percent between the first and third quar-
ters of 2002. This observation suggests that our ear-
lier estimate was too conservative, implying that we
understated the cost to steel consumers. We now
revisit our estimates by regressing the percentage
change in the producer price index for steel as a
whole on a number of independent variables that
are likely to affect domestic steel prices.23 Analyzing
the producer price index for steel as a whole may
overlook important differences between steel prod-
ucts, but finished steel products pass through a va-
riety of stages, which distributes the price effects of
tariffs throughout the menu of products that the
industry offers. In essence, the regression model
calculates the effect on domestic prices of a 10 per-
cent increase in the tariff on aggregate steel imports
from “remedy countries”, holding the pre-tariff price
of those imports and other factors constant.24 Rem-
edy countries are those like Japan and the Euro-
pean Union that did not get a free pass as Canada,
Mexico, and developing countries did.
Table B.1 in appendix B shows the results of the
regression. Most of the substantive independent vari-
ables have plausible signs and are statistically sig-
nificant. The model indicates that every 10 percent
tariff increase on steel imported from remedy coun-
tries results in almost a 7 percent increase in the
average domestic steel price. However, the average
tariff increase against aggregate steel imports from
remedy countries has been considerably less than
30 percent due to product exclusions and impor-
tantly due to the large volume of products from rem-
edy countries on which no additional tariffs were
imposed. As a consequence, the calculated average
increase in domestic steel prices as a consequence
of safeguard tariffs is considerably less than 21 per-
cent (30 percent times 0.7).25 Based on the confi-
dence interval of the model, we are 90 percent confi-
dent that the safeguard tariffs raised the average
price of all domestic steel products between 1.3 per-
cent and 5.1 percent between the first and third
quarters of 2002 and our best guess is a 3.3 percent
increase. For various reasons, however this estimate
is likely to understate the effect of the safeguard
tariffs.26
Even a 5.1 percent price increase may not sound
severe. Indeed, the steel industry incessantly asserts
that the safeguard tariffs merely gave a modest price
lift from historical lows.27 However, a seemingly mod-
erate price increase can have severe consequences
for steel-consuming firms whose balance sheets are
already strained by the struggling economy and who
face overseas competition that can buy steel at
cheaper prices.28 Also, the tariffs have been extremely
disruptive to US firms that rely on steel imports to
make consumer goods. Perhaps most importantly,
while any price increase helps the bottom line of steel
producers, the price increases in 2002 are clearly
not enough to save high-cost integrated firms. Thus,
our conclusion echoes our previous policy briefs:
safeguard tariffs hurt consumers of domestic steel
but the corresponding benefits to steel producers are
manifestly insufficient to cure their woes. The tie-
breaker is the plight of US firms that rely on im-
ported steel, which are being forced to overcome se-
vere (and unjust) barriers to their operations.
The Bad—Many US Integrated Steel Firms Are Still
in Trouble
Despite the recent increase in steel prices, many
integrated mills are still incapable of making healthy
profits. The reason why many integrated mills lose
money even with higher steel prices is simple: their
average costs are even higher. In this section, we
23. All variables except the quarterly dummy variables were
expressed in natural logarithms. Percentage changes are
approximated by the first difference in logarithmic values.
24. See appendix B for more details of this regression and
subsequent simulation. By aggregate steel imports, we mean all
steel products that fall under SITC 67, regardless of whether
they are included in the Section 201 remedies.
25. A price response of 0.66 may be a rough estimate for how
much the price of a specific domestic steel product should
increase (in percentage terms) for each 1.0 percent increase in
the tariff on a specific steel product from a remedy country.
Another rule of thumb could be that 39 percent (3.3 divided by
8.4) of the increase in a particular domestic steel product’s price
is attributable to the Section 201 tariffs. However, the price
response may be greater or lesser depending on the product.
Despite the Section 201
tariffs, all the antidumping
orders and increased capacity
utilization, the steel industry
as a whole will still take an
after-tax loss for the
year 2002.
26. See appendix B for further explanation.
27. We agree with Mueller (2002) that comparing current steel
prices to historical steel prices is a fruitless exercise, given the
magnitude of the change that the steel industry has undergone
in recent years. The increase in productivity driven by minimills
should generally cause steel prices to decline.
28. For example, Francois and Baughman (2002) and Crandall
(2002) found that even small increases in the price of domestic
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examine the reasons why the performance of the US
steel industry as a whole is consistently poor.
Sales, Profits, and Stock Prices
Figure 2 shows the revenue and after-tax profits
for the US iron and steel industry along with the
price of the Dow Jones Steel Index on a quarterly
basis from 1993 to the third quarter of 2002.29 Stock
prices are largely a function of expected profits, and
steel stocks had a bad year in 2002. During the first
three quarters of 2002, the Dow Jones Steel Index
lost more value in percentage terms (27.7 percent)
than the Dow Jones Industrial Average (24.2 per-
cent), despite the absence of accounting scandals in
the steel industry.30 Stock markets are not always
right, but figure 2 illustrates that change in the Dow
Jones Steel Index has been a good leading indicator
of steel revenue in subsequent quarters.
During the period from 1993Q1 to 2002Q3, the
iron and steel industry as a whole has never made
an after-tax quarterly profit of more than $1 billion.
The steel industry lost $800 million after taxes
through the first three quarters of 2002. Despite the
Section 201 tariffs, all the antidumping orders, and
increased capacity utilization, the steel industry as
a whole will still take an after-tax loss for the year
2002.
Based on the sales figures for the second and
third quarters of 2002 and assuming a 3.3 percent
price increase, the Section 201 tariffs are respon-
sible for only $1 billion in additional revenue for the
steel industry. Although this figure may be conser-
vative, it should be kept in mind that additional prof-
its are considerably less because downstream steel
producers must pay higher prices for raw steel.
In the “pre-crisis” period of 1996 to 1998, the
industry earned $19.22 per short ton produced, a
profit margin of less than 3 percent. In the “crisis”
period of 1999 to 2001, the industry lost $16.30 per
short ton produced, a loss of less than 3 percent.31
Although average steel prices declined about 10 per-
cent in the “crisis period” relative to the “pre-crisis”
Figure 2  Sales, profits, and stock price in the US iron and steel industry, 1993-2002
Note: Dow Jones (DJ) Steel Index values are taken on the last day of each quarter.
Sources: US Census Bureau (2002); Yahoo Finance (2002).
29. The Dow Jones Steel Index consists of seven US firms: AK
Steel, Allegheny Technologies, Carpenter Technology, Nucor,
Ryerson Tull, US Steel, and Worthington Industries.
30. Data comes from Yahoo (2002). 31. Production data (not shown) is from USGS (2002a).   January 2003 PB03-1 10
Figure 3 Profit margins of minimills and integrated mills, 1995-2002
Figure 4 Performance of the US steel industry
Note: Profit margin is calculated as net income (excluding unusual items) as a percent of revenue.  See footnote 32 for the compa-
nies that constitute each sample.
Source: SEC (2002).
Note: For explanation of SIC 331, see footnote 1 in Appendix B; NAICS 3311,2 is very similar to SIC 331.
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period, profit margins deteriorated only 5.5 percent,
due to the shift in steel production away from high-
cost integrated mills to minimills.
Figure 3 shows the annual operating margins
for a sample of US integrated mills and a sample of
US minimills between 1995 and 2002.32 While the
minimills remained profitable (even during 2001),
integrated mills are still losing money in 2002. Al-
though the competitive advantages of minimills have
been in place for a long time, figure 3 illustrates an
important point emphasized in our previous policy
briefs: steel protection helps strong firms more than
weak ones.
Capacity in the US steel industry
Figure 4 shows steel capacity and capacity utili-
zation between 1980 and 2002 and the producer price
index for steel since 1986. US steel capacity was ra-
tionalized substantially between 1983 and 1987
(dropping 25 percent) and remained essentially flat
until 1994. Between 1994 and 2000, minimills in-
creased capacity much faster than integrated mills
shed capacity, so US steel capacity as a whole ex-
panded by 20 percent. Since 2001, steel capacity
has declined sharply, which has helped push ca-
pacity utilization up to 86 percent in August 2002.33
However, the US steel industry faces an impor-
tant Catch-22: In order for the steel industry as a
whole to turn a profit, prices need to be extremely
high, but high prices encourage steel firms to in-
crease capacity and output, which drives down steel
prices. The capacity increases that started in 1988
and in 1995 both followed a period of rising steel
prices. The same thing will probably happen in 2003.
In 2001, eight flat-rolled mills that accounted for 16
million short tons of annual capacity were idled, but
now four of them have restarted, adding 10 million
short tons back to US steel-making capacity. LTV
Corporation, whose idled assets were sold to new
owners (the International Steel Group, ISG) in 2002,
is the biggest component of the fluctuation in flat-
rolled capacity (6 to 7 million short tons).34 The stock
market is astutely betting that this increase in steel
supply will drive down steel prices and profits, which
helps explain the poor performance of the Dow Jones
Steel Index.
Pathetic efforts by the administration to induce
US steel firms to restructure can also be considered
among the “bad” aspects of US steel policy. To ap-
pear even-handed, the Bush administration required
US steel producers to submit reports to the USTR
by September 5, 2002, documenting how they
planned to restructure. The steel firms were also
asked to submit public versions of the report (i.e.
deleting confidential business information) by the
same deadline. Four months later there have been
zero public reports. But the September press releases
issued by the steel firms describing the confidential
versions suggest that the reports are probably not
worth reading.
The press releases have three common elements,
which can be paraphrased as:
• We have been restructuring for many years re-
sulting in many lost jobs.
• We plan to reduce costs and improve quality in
the future.
• Safeguard tariffs need to remain in place for two
more years in order to implement our plan.35
In a capitalist economy, nearly every firm—no mat-
ter the industry, country, or time period—has plans
to reduce costs and improve quality.  We do not be-
lieve tariffs are essential to keep the capitalist en-
gine working; in fact, safeguards—in the absence of
industry restructuring—only hurt the engine’s per-
formance. Nor do we believe the industry should be
given “credit” for past restructuring that was forced
upon it by market forces. The real question should
32. 2002 data includes the first three quarters if available and
is taken from SEC (2002). The samples closely correspond to
the sample used by the International Trade Commission in its
Industry, Trade, and Technology Review, which regularly includes
a similar chart. In this paper, the integrated mill sample includes
ACME Metals, AK Steel, Bethlehem Steel, LTV, Ispat Inland, US
Steel, Weirton, and National Steel. The minimill sample includes
AmeriSteel, Nucor, Oregon Steel, and Steel Dynamics. Some firms
are not included in some years due to closings and mergers.
33. Utilization of raw steel capacity, as reported by the AISI
(2002b), has been 90 percent for the period January-October
2002. The data in figure 4 pertain to the steel industry as a
whole. In contrast, capacity utilization for durable goods
manufacturing as a whole has hovered around 70 percent in
2002 and has not reached the 90 percent range since 1967,
according to data from the FRB (2002).
34. Figures come from Steel Business Briefing (2002), quoting
Mark Parr of McDonald Investments.
35. The press releases also usually endorse the continued use
of antidumping tariffs and countervailing duties.
We do not believe tariffs are essential to
keep the capitalist engine working; in fact,
safeguards—in the absence of industry
restructuring—only hurt the engine’s
performance.January 2003 PB03-1 12
be: What actions are US steel producers taking that
would not be possible without tariffs? The press re-
leases do not answer this question.
In our view, the steel industry should emphasize
measures that reduce capacity permanently. Sadly,
although Section 201 requires recipient industries
to restructure in exchange for protection, the Bush
administration lacks the gumption to ask hard ques-
tions about capacity reduction—much less to sub-
ject steel industry replies to public scrutiny.
Legacy Costs
Legacy costs are health care and pension
obligations that integrated steel firms owe to their
retirees. These costs were estimated to run some $13
billion in net present value as of 1999.36 In 1999,
health expenditures for retirees at seven integrated
steel firms amounted to $15 per ton of steel, and
pension benefits added another $50 per ton. These
seven integrated firms lost about $7 per ton in 1999
(and much more in 2000 and 2001), so legacy costs
are a substantial obstacle to profitability.37 The legacy
cost dilemma arises from the fact that legacy costs
weaken the financial position of a firm but
simultaneously act as a “poison pill” that prevents a
merger with another firm that has a stronger balance
sheet.
Bethlehem Steel, with its $9 billion in legacy
costs, illustrates this dilemma.38 Bethlehem filed for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy in October 2001. Under
Chapter 11, the firm continues to operate but can
forestall debt payments (including legacy costs).
Bethlehem wants to merge with another domestic
steel producer to avoid liquidation under Chapter 7.
On January 6, 2003, it was announced that ISG
(the company formed from the assets of LTV and
Acme Metals) had offered to purchase substantially
all of Bethlehem's assets and to assume a small frac-
tion of Bethlehem's liabilities for a total cost of $1.5
billion. This offer will likely be approved soon by
Bethlehem's management, the USWA, and the bank-
ruptcy judge even though Bethlehem listed $2.7 bil-
lion worth of property, plant, and equipment as of
November 30, 2002.39
What will happen to Bethlehem's workforce re-
mains to be seen. ISG has a general agreement with
the USWA that apparently will apply when ISG as-
sumes control of Bethlehem’s assets. The USWA gen-
erally supports ISG's efforts because ISG’s cost-cut-
ting strategy has focused on eliminating salaried
employees and trimming benefits more so than cut-
ting wages and eliminating job opportunities for
hourly workers. But much of Bethlehem’s total
workforce (perhaps 40 percent) will likely be laid off.
Late in 2002, Bethlehem planned on giving its older
workers an early retirement proposal, but the Pen-
sion Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBGC) fore-
closed that option by assuming control of
Bethlehem’s pension plan in December 2002. Once
the PBGC assumes control of a pension plan, the
company cannot increase the PBGC’s liability by of-
fering more generous pension benefits as part of an
early retirement package. ISG may be contemplat-
ing offering early retirement proposals to older work-
ers that would expand upon the terms of its existing
agreement with the USWA. However, any of
Bethlehem’s workers who are laid off would likely
qualify for health benefits and wage insurance un-
der the TAA program enacted by Congress in 2002
as part of the TPA package.
Since the US government is now picking up part
of the legacy costs of liquidated firms via the en-
hanced TAA program, some say that Chapter 7 liq-
uidation or Bethlehem-style asset sales are not such
bad outcomes. Assets are sold in a competitive fash-
ion and the new owners escape the burden of legacy
costs and restrictive union contracts. Under these
circumstances, the new owners should be able to
operate profitably. In individual cases, the capitalist
system—underpinned by bankruptcy liquidation—
is working just as Joseph Schumpeter prescribed!
The benchmark, however, should be whether the
liquidation system as a whole—taking public and pri-
vate actors together—performs efficiently, not
whether it works for an individual steel firm. In a
The legacy cost dilemma arises
from the fact that legacy costs
weaken the financial position of a
firm but simultaneously act as a
“poison pill” that prevents a
merger with another firm that has
a stronger balance sheet.
39. SEC (2002)
36. Figure comes from Klinefelter (2002). Another potential
“legacy cost” is the cost of future environmental cleanup;
however, we set this issue aside (as many others do) mainly for
lack of even ballpark estimates.
37. Data on pension and health care costs is from USWA (2001)
Net loss per ton is derived from this data as well as annual reports
maintained by the SEC (2002). The seven major integrated steel
firms are U.S. Steel, Bethlehem, LTV, AK Steel, National Steel,
Ispat-Inland, and Wheeling-Pittsburgh. LTV has since been
liquidated.
38. See Crenshaw (2002).January 2003 PB03-1
Chapter 7 liquidation, the firm’s assets are sold to
pay secured creditors to the extent possible and the
remaining unsecured obligations (such as legacy
costs) are simply not fulfilled. As a result, a sub-
stantial part of legacy costs, together with loan guar-
antees and adjustment costs, become a public obli-
gation. Hard-nosed advocates of market capitalism
might say that the right answer is to get the govern-
ment out of the business of paying legacy and ad-
justment costs and making loan guarantees. We dis-
agree with their prescription; more importantly, we
do not think hard-nosed capitalism is about to be-
come public policy—for steel or any other major sec-
tor. We think the sensible approach is to accept the
government safety net, and then ask how to improve
its efficiency over the medium term.
Seen as a system, private liquidation fosters pub-
lic subsidization. A new private firm gets the benefit
(steel assets at a cheap price) while the public bud-
get is saddled with various costs (legacy obligations,
loan guarantees, employment insurance, etc). If pub-
lic costs were a one-time event, that might be ac-
ceptable. However, the public burden is not just a
one-time event. Instead ex post public assistance in
all its guises feeds the cycle of overcapacity that leads
to future firm failures.40
Two other factors compound this problem. First,
the USWA contributes to the cycle of failure by in-
sisting that all union contracts be roughly compa-
rable. The buyer of liquidated assets is thus pres-
sured to meet the unionized standard for salary, ben-
efits, and work rules. This is a high standard in the
face of nonunion competition and can lay the ground-
work for future bankruptcies. Second, public sup-
port for the US steel industry provides a handy ex-
cuse for other countries to subsidize their steel in-
dustries, which they are inclined to do anyway. This
in turn provokes trade remedies both in the United
States and elsewhere. The pathological combination
of private markets and public subsidies is not, of
course, confined to the United States. It is an en-
demic feature of the steel industry in Europe and
other parts of the world.41
The Bethlehem saga illustrates another aggra-
vating circumstance to this cycle. In order to com-
plete its deal with ISG, Bethlehem wanted to cut its
workforce by offering early retirement to older work-
ers. It is generally good to reduce the number of steel
workers, but there is a moral hazard problem:
Bethlehem and other failing steel firms have every
incentive to offer overly generous terms to induce
early retirement because they have no intention of
fufilling them and have every intention of passing
the costs on to the government. The Pension Benefit
Guarantee Corporation—whose financial resources
are already stretched too thin—intervened to pre-
vent additional early retirements, which in this case
put capacity reduction and the renegotiation of re-
strictive union contracts in jeopardy, although in the
end, it appears that ISG managed to overcome these
hurdles.
We think the medium-term solution lies in re-
ducing high-cost capacity rather than artificially lim-
iting competition through trade protection. Minimills,
which have low fixed costs, have been doing well for
years. But reducing high-cost capacity will require a
very difficult political decision: Congress will have
to appropriate additional money without giving in to
the temptation to use public money as a life-support
system for failing steel firms. In our previous policy
brief, we proposed a “Grand Bargain” where the gov-
ernment would assume a portion of the legacy costs
of some integrated firms, if those firms were willing
to reduce total capacity in a merger. The Bush ad-
ministration shows no willingness to pursue this or
any other legacy cost initiative (aside from its grudg-
ing acceptance of the enhanced TAA provisions).
Thus, the various bills in Congress that address
legacy costs stand little chance of becoming law.
Given the tenor of the bills as written, this may be a
good outcome, because congressional sponsors gen-
erally attempt to preserve capacity rather than elimi-
nate it.42 However, as laid out in our recommenda-
tions, we think it is possible to condition legacy cost
relief on capacity reduction and buy out rather than
bail out high-cost steel producers.
13
40. The Emergency Steel Loan Guarantee Act of 1999 offers loan
guarantees to the steel industry, but has only been utilized once.
Since the Act did not induce creditors to loan money to LTV and
Geneva Steel despite the 85 percent (or more) guarantee, several
House bills contain language to make the program even more
generous. We think this is a very bad idea. See Cooney (2002)
for additional details on the House bills.
41. Nor is the cycle confined to the steel industry. Shipbuilding
is another pathological case.
The first step the United States
should take is to offer to suspend
the steel safeguards against any
country that commits to the
US plan to end market distortions
in the steel industry.
42. See Cooney (2002) for a summary and status report for these
various bills.  January 2003 PB03-1
The Ugly—US Steel Policy Provokes International
Trade Conflicts
The international dimensions of US steel policy
are primarily debated in the OECD and the WTO.
The first two prongs of President Bush’s steel plan—
to reduce excess capacity and market-distorting prac-
tices—are being pursued in leisurely fashion in quar-
terly OECD meetings. The third prong—Section 201
relief—has been challenged by seven countries and
the European Union under WTO rules. US trading
partners have also challenged the WTO legality of
other US steel-related policies, notably the Byrd
Amendment and the methodologies used to deter-
mine antidumping (AD) and countervailing duties
(CVD).
Both the United States and the international
community link these various issues, but do so in
different ways. The United States argues that trade
remedies are triggered by excess capacity resulting
from public and private distortions and that AD,
CVD, and safeguard measures are needed to force
the international community to curtail the distor-
tions, thereby reducing high-cost, excess capacity.
The international community sees US penalty du-
ties, especially AD tariffs, as thinly disguised pro-
tection, which should be put on the negotiating table
as part of a comprehensive effort to eliminate mar-
ket distortions. Both sides are correct in identifying
each other’s market-distorting practices, but the cen-
tral failure of US steel policy has been to insist that
foreign countries reform their practices without of-
fering concessions of its own.
OECD Steel Meetings
The first few meetings of steel-producing coun-
tries at the OECD have focused on the elimination
of excess capacity. There is no internationally ac-
cepted definition of what constitutes “excess” capac-
ity. Among the worst definitions is one frequently
used in US steel industry and USWA publications:
Excess capacity equals domestic capacity minus do-
mestic consumption. This flawed definition serves
only to paint the United States as a victim and would
be appropriate only in a fantasy world of 100 per-
cent capacity utilization and balanced trade in the
steel industry.
A better definition of excess capacity would be
capacity that is habitually unprofitable (after deduct-
ing public subsidies from private revenues). Some
form of this definition appears to be gaining ground
in OECD talks. However, all habitually unprofitable
steel firms assert that they would be profitable if
only their habitually unprofitable competitors would
shut down. As a result, the OECD capacity reduc-
tion talks have made little progress. The OECD par-
ticipants did set a goal of eliminating 130 million
short tons of gross steelmaking capacity by 2005,
and they established a peer-review mechanism to
monitor each country’s progress. Given this “soft”
framework, the 130 million-ton goal will only be met
to the extent that market forces dictate. Even if mar-
ket forces take out 130 million short tons of old,
high-cost capacity, nothing precludes the installa-
tion of 130 million (or more) tons of new low-cost
capacity. Indeed, the recent worldwide steel price
increase makes it less likely that old, high-cost ca-
pacity will be retired and more likely that new, low-
cost capacity will be installed.
President Bush’s safeguard tariffs—the third
prong of his “comprehensive” steel plan—has served
to undermine the first two prongs of his plan by in-
ducing other countries to enact their own safeguards
against steel imports. In our previous policy brief,
we predicted a “domino effect”—other countries
would enact protectionist barriers on both steel and
other products if the United States went ahead with
its steel safeguards. Our prediction has been more
than vindicated. In the first nine months of 2002,
there have been 116 non-US safeguard investiga-
tions (94 in the “steel and metals” industry includ-
ing those by the European Union and Canada) as
compared to 20 non-US safeguard investigations
during the 12 months of 2001.43 For the first time,
the worldwide number of new safeguard investiga-
tions for all products is on track to exceed the num-
ber of new AD investigations (109 through the first
nine months of 2002), and the number of exporters
included in a safeguard investigation is always much
larger than in an AD investigation.44
At the September 2002 OECD meeting, the
United States proposed a four-part plan to eliminate
the market distortions that give rise to excess steel
capacity:
• Prohibit all subsides to the steel industry—ex-
cept for subsidies intended to facilitate the closing
of steel capacity (i.e. health and pension legacy
costs, plus environmental legacy costs).
• Abolish all market access barriers—except safe-
guards and AD/CVD duties.
• Enforce domestic laws that combat anticomp-
etitive practices.
43. The United States initiated 33 steel safeguard investigations
bringing the total number of safeguard investigations worldwide
to 53 in 2001. The United States has not initiated any safeguard
investigations in 2002, except for one against China under a
special safeguard provision.
44. Data from Stevenson (2002).
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• Strictly limit new preferential financing to the
steel sector, such as multilateral loans and export
credits.
The European Union and other steel producers ini-
tially objected to the US proposal because it did not
reform US trade remedy laws, which the interna-
tional community believes are abused to the point of
market distortion. In the OECD meetings in Decem-
ber 2002, the steel producing nations agreed to a
compromise. They will first discuss the elimination
of most subsidies and then discuss the reform of
trade remedy laws—but in order to succeed the two
sets of discussions would ultimately have to be tied
together into a single agreement. In other words,
other countries will insist that the United States re-
form its trade remedy laws (perhaps in the Doha
negotiations) before they agree to limit their steel
subsidies. Until the December OECD meeting, the
United States adamantly refused to take the one step
necessary to jumpstart international negotiations—
putting its own protection on the negotiating table.45
Now that the US stance has softened, we urge the
Bush administration not to scuttle whatever progress
is made on the subsidies front by taking a hard line
on trade remedies. To this end, in the final section,
we offer a proposal to reform the way the United
States applies trade remedies.
US government and steel officials often dismiss
the need for US concessions by asserting that the
United States is the “world’s steel dumping ground.”
This claim is specious. The United States does im-
port a larger quantity and value of steel than any
other country, but this is true of hundreds of prod-
ucts simply because the US economy is much larger
than that of any other country. For the year 2001, if
the value of iron and steel imports is taken as a share
of GDP, Japan (0.07 percent) ranks as the most
closed followed by the United States (0.15 percent),
and the European Union (0.16 percent for extra-EU
imports). Twelve other countries imported more steel
as a share of GDP in 2001, and the average for these
15 importing nations was 0.41 percent.46 Thus, the
average importer in this sample had almost triple
the US openness to iron and steel imports in 2001.
The primary reason why steel imports made up
such a small share of US GDP in 2001 was the preva-
lence of AD and CVD orders and investigations. Of
the 336 US AD and CVD orders in place as of No-
vember 2002, 57 percent (191) were related to iron
and steel.47 Between 1980 and 2000, $18 billion of
steel imports have been subject to an AD or a CVD
investigation, and $10 billion of imports were penal-
ized with an AD or CVD tariff.48
Moreover, there is a substantial overlap between
US AD/CVD orders and US Section 201 tariffs, as is
shown in table 2. There are 686 types of iron and
steel products at the 10-digit level of the US Harmo-
Table 2 Overlap between Section 201 and AD/CVD tariffs
Notes: Numbers represent the number of 10-digit classifications within chapters 72 and 73 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule. We
can reject the null hypothesis that Section 201 tariff increases and AD/CVD orders are independent under both a chi-squared test
and a Fisher exact test.
Sources: US Customs Department (2002a, 2002b).
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46. The data comes from the WTO (2002b) and IMF (2002). These
15 importing nations were the only ones that imported more
than $1 billion worth of iron and steel imports in 2001.
47. USITC (2002b).
48. Figures come from Hillman (2002).
45. The same attitude— “It’s your fault, not mine. You reform
first.”—cramped the US negotiating stance in the run-up to
the failed Seattle Summit in October 1999.January 2003 PB03-1
nized Tariff Schedule. Of these 686, 172 are affected
by Section 201 remedies and 385 are affected by AD
or CVD orders. Of the 425 iron and steel products
not affected by Section 201 remedies, half are sub-
ject to an AD/CVD order and half are not. But, of
the 261 iron and steel products affected by Section
201 remedies, two-thirds are also affected by an AD
or CVD order. In other words, for the most part Sec-
tion 201 remedies and AD/CVD orders are in prac-
tice, complementary measures, not alternative mea-
sures.49
This correlation between Section 201 remedies
and AD/CVD orders suggests a legal dilemma for
US steel import policy. One possibility is that peti-
tioners in AD/CVD cases have been injured by steel
imports not subject to the AD/CVD investigation,
which raises the question of whether the ITC im-
properly blames steel imports subject to the AD/CVD
investigation for materially injuring the domestic
industry. Alternatively, the US safeguard decision
may have been a primary function of steel import
prices rather than a primary function of steel im-
port volume. Volume increases are an essential ele-
ment of a safeguard case, both under the WTO Agree-
ment on Safeguards and US law. Under either ex-
planation of the observed correlation, US steel pro-
ducers are “double-dipping” on protectionism and
steel producers in other countries are not happy
about it.
WTO Dispute Settlement
The WTO Agreement on Safeguards permits tem-
porary protective tariffs for distressed industries, but
the associated obligations are relatively strict. The
United States simply ignored many of the obligations.
Moreover, the coverage of US safeguard tariffs was
substantial. President Bush applied tariffs to about
$10 billion worth of steel imports—the equivalent of
two decades worth of AD and CVD orders. With this
background, it comes as no surprise that the inter-
national community is asking the WTO to condemn
the safeguard tariffs.
The first problem with the US safeguard action
is that the ITC included imports from Canada and
Mexico (which constitute almost a fifth of total US
steel imports) in its injury investigation, but Presi-
dent Bush did not subject NAFTA partners to his
tariff remedies. In a previous case, the WTO Appel-
late Body rebuked the United States for this prac-
tice and required “parallelism”—that NAFTA part-
ners be included in both the injury investigation and
the remedy, or not be included at all.50
16
Note: Year 1 in the Argentine footwear case is 1991, while year 1 is 1996 in the US steel case. See footnote 53 for an explanation of
how we treated data in year 6.
Sources: Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry of Japan (1992) and USITC (2002c).
Figure 5  Comparison of import surges preceding US steel and Argentine footwear safeguards
49. The null hypothesis between Section 201 and AD/CVD
orders has a less than one in ten thousand chance of being
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50. The text of NAFTA requires that the United States exclude
Canada and Mexico from safeguard remedies or provide them
with immediate compensation. This provision of NAFTA is
probably inconsistent with WTO obligations, although no country
has directly challenged the NAFTA provision.
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After the ITC made its remedy recommendations,
USTR Robert Zoellick sent a letter to the ITC Com-
missioners asking (among other things) if their in-
jury determinations would have been different had
imports from Canada and Mexico been excluded from
the injury investigation. The Commissioners said
“no”, but did not give extensive analysis nor did they
hold further hearings. The WTO will probably find
fault with the missing parallelism.
The second problem with the US Section 201 ac-
tion is that increased imports of like or directly com-
petitive steel products are not the principal cause of
the domestic industry’s distress. Article 2.1 of the
WTO Agreement on Safeguards permits safeguards:
... only if that Member has determined ... that such
product is being imported into its territory in such
increased quantities, absolute or relative to do-
mestic production, and under such conditions as
to cause or threaten to cause serious injury to the
domestic industry that produces like or directly
competitive products (emphasis added) ...
The United States has been accused of violating each
of the bold phrases. There is no dispute that US im-
ports of most steel products increased between 1996
and 1998 and then declined between 1998 and
2001—in some cases to sub-1996 levels.51 The WTO
Appellate Body in a previous safeguard case involv-
ing footwear imports by Argentina deemed that “the
increase in imports must have been recent enough,
sudden enough, sharp enough, and significant
enough, both quantitatively and qualitatively, to
cause or threaten to cause ‘serious injury’.”52
The United States is making the heroic attempt
to meet this burden by contending that low steel
prices in 2000 and 2001 were largely caused by the
increase in imports up through 1998. This argument
will likely fall on deaf ears because steel import prices
continued to fall between 1998 and 2001, even as
the quantity of imports declined substantially. Thus,
while the United States may be able to prove that, in
2001, steel was being imported “under such condi-
tions” (low prices) as to cause serious injury, it will
not be able to meet the two-pronged test that steel
was being imported “in such increased quantities”
and “under such conditions” as to cause serious in-
jury to the domestic industry.
Figure 5 compares the percentage increases in
imports in the safeguard cases involving both Ar-
gentine footwear imports and US imports of flat steel
products.53 The five years shown in the figure are
1991 to 1995 for Argentine footwear imports and
1996 to 2000 for US flat steel imports, with a projec-
tion for 2001 in order to simulate the evidence fac-
ing the ITC during the injury investigation.54 Con-
sidering that the WTO Appellate Body found that
the increase in footwear imports was insufficient to
justify Argentina’s safeguard, the United States has
little hope of winning its case. The growth peak in
the quantity of US flat steel imports was barely half
that of Argentine footwear imports. Although the
decline from the peak in the fourth and fifth years
under safeguard investigation was steeper for Ar-
gentine footwear, US flat steel imports were projected
to fall precipitously in 2001 to half their 1998 levels.
Moreover, Argentine footwear imports were 70 per-
cent above the original level in the fifth year as com-
pared to a mere 14 percent increase in the US steel
case by the fifth year (and an absolute decline when
annualized data from the sixth year is taken into
account).
Other WTO members also make persuasive ar-
guments that the ITC failed to adequately separate
the harm caused by increased imports from the harm
caused by other factors, such as minimills, legacy
costs, and changes in demand. Furthermore, other
members contend that the ITC should not have con-
sidered four or five disparate flat steel products to
17
53. For this calculation, flat steel imports are defined as slabs,
plate, hot-rolled steel, cold-rolled steel, and coated steel
according to the definition used by the majority of the ITC. Tin
and grain-oriented electrical steel are not included in this
definition.
54. We annualized data for 2001 by multiplying the growth rate
of imports for flat steel products in the first six months of 2001
compared to the same period in 2000 by the annual data for
2000 to produce a seasonally adjusted projection for 2001 flat
steel imports. Simply doubling imports for the first six months
of 2001 would result in an upwardly biased projection because
steel imports generally peak in the second quarter.
In the spirit of our earlier Grand
Bargain, we propose that the
US government offer to assume
a percentage of a steel firm’s total
long-term legacy obligation
(inclusive of environmental legacy
 costs) equal to the percentage of its
capacity that the firm is willing to
permanently shutter.
51. Technically, the ITC only considered the first half of 2001 in
its injury investigation but imports on a year-to-date basis were
still declining relative to the same period in 2000.
52. WTO (1999, paragraph 131).January 2003 PB03-1
be a single “like or directly competitive” product for
the purpose of assessing injury. Indeed, considering
unfinished steel slabs to be like or directly competi-
tive with tin and other flat finished steel products,
seems about as logical as filling a car with imported
crude oil rather than gasoline.
Finally, even if the United States prevails on all
these contested issues, it will have a difficult time
meeting an additional WTO requirement—that the
remedy be proportional to the harm caused by im-
ports. In fact, there is a negative correlation between
the products with the strongest Section 201 rem-
edies and the products that experienced the largest
percentage increases in import volume between 1996
and 2001. Put another way, the products with
smaller percentage increases in import volume re-
ceived stronger trade remedies.55
The Section 201 case is not the only instance
where US steel policy has been challenged in the
WTO. Recently the Commerce Department changed
its methodology in response to adverse WTO rulings
regarding the calculation of AD and CVD steel du-
ties. Meanwhile, a WTO panel found that the Con-
tinued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act (the Byrd
Amendment) is inconsistent with WTO obligations.
The United States is appealing the decision on the
Byrd Amendment (the appeal will allow at least one
more disbursement to petitioners while hearings take
place).
Unlike the Section 201 tariffs, which can be re-
scinded unilaterally by the President, Congress would
have to repeal the Byrd Amendment in order to best
comply with the WTO Appellate Body ruling. Greg
Mastel, Chief Trade Counsel in 2002 for the Senate
Finance Committee, confidently predicted that the
Senate would choose not to comply with the WTO
rulings on the Byrd Amendment.56 If so, the prece-
dent set in the recent WTO arbitration ruling in the
Foreign Sales Corporation (FSC) case does not bode
well for US exporters.57 The Byrd Amendment shells
out over $200 million annually to petitioning firms
(inclusive of steel firms). Under the FSC precedent,
each of the 11 trade partners that challenged the
Byrd Amendment could impose prohibitive tariffs on
$200 million of US exports each year.
If the United States chooses not to comply with
adverse WTO rulings on the Section 201 tariffs, as
well as the Byrd Amendment, other countries may
feel forced to retaliate. A “steel war” will not advance
the prospects for substantial trade liberalization in
the FTAA or the WTO. On the other hand, if the
United States does comply with WTO dispute settle-
ment decisions, then Congress may be especially
skeptical of any trade package coming out of the FTAA
or WTO that reforms safeguard, AD, or CVD rem-
edies. Putting all this together, despite the passage
of TPA, difficult trade negotiations are made all that
much harder—both at home and abroad—by con-
flicts over US steel policy.
Recommendations
The administration needs to pursue a new steel
strategy that can gain support from both Congress
and the international community. Pressure is build-
ing on the domestic front from steel users who re-
sent paying extra for steel in a weak economy. On
the international front, pressure has waned slightly
due to product exclusions and high world steel prices.
However, declining steel prices in 2003 and WTO
disapproval of US safeguard tariffs seem almost in-
evitable. When those two events occur, trade part-
ners will again turn up the heat on the United States.
Many steps need to be taken but most of them re-
quire at least tacit approval from the US Congress.
Here we offer recommendations that we think will
be beneficial to the steel industry and possibly pal-
atable to Congress.
International Dimension
The first step the United States should take is to
offer to suspend the steel safeguards against any
country that commits to the US plan to end market
distortions in the steel industry. The Bush adminis-
tration can take this step unilaterally. Since US safe-
guard tariffs will probably be disapproved by the WTO
Appellate Body in late 2003, this bargaining chip
should be used quickly before the panel and Appel-
late Body make their decisions.
In addition, the United States could propose to
clarify the language in the WTO Agreement on Safe-
guards regarding the time frame for safeguard in-
vestigations. As written, nothing in the WTO Agree-
ment explicitly prevents a country from imposing
safeguards on the grounds that imports of a prod-
uct have increased substantially since the Marrakesh
Declaration was signed in 1994. The time frame could
18
55. The data comes from the USITC (2002c). We annualized data
for 2001 by multiplying the growth rate of imports for each steel
product in the first six months of 2001 compared to the same
period in 2000 by the annual data for 2000 to produce a
seasonally adjusted projection for 2001 imports, in order to
replicate the evidence facing the ITC at the time of the
investigation. Simply doubling imports for the first six months
of 2001 would result in an upwardly biased projection because
steel imports generally peak in the second quarter. The 33
products were ranked by the percentage increase in import
quantity from 1996 to 2001 (annual projection) and by the
magnitude of the tariff remedy. The Spearman rank correlation
is statistically significant at the 98 percent confidence level and
has a value of –0.43.
56. Quoted in Inside US Trade (2002).
57. See Hufbauer (2002).January 2003 PB03-1 19
be tightened—for example, to the most recent 36-
month period for which data is available at the time
of the investigation.
Foreign steel producers fear AD investigations
launched by the US steel industry as much if not
more than safeguard measures. In the first stage of
an AD case, the plaintiffs need only to prove that
imports are being sold at less-than-fair-value (LTFV);
the domestic industry does not need to show that
low prices are the result of a less-than-fair-practice,
such as a cartel, a subsidy, or predatory pricing.58
This is akin to accusing students who earn high test
scores of cheating without alleging (much less prov-
ing) that they improperly collaborated or had advance
knowledge of the questions. Thus, unfair trade rem-
edies purportedly combat a process (unfair competi-
tion) solely on the basis of an outcome (export prices
that are either below average cost—the great major-
ity of cases—or that are below prices charged in the
home market or third country markets). In the sec-
ond stage of an AD case, the petitioners must prove
that imports sold at LTFV cause material injury or
threat of material injury to a domestic industry.
“Material injury” has come to be interpreted as slight
injury.59
We propose a new system to replace the material
injury test with a test that is directly aimed at the
market-distortion issue. The administration should
propose legislation that has the effect of applying a
“smoking gun” test to cases involving industries (such
as steel) that suffer from systemic market distor-
tions. Once the Commerce Department finds LTFV
sales, the ITC should determine, based on the pre-
ponderance of the evidence, whether the subject im-
ports are sold at LTFV because of market-distorting
practices. If so, then the existence of a less-than-
fair-practice (LTFP) would suffice to prove that the
domestic industry is threatened by material injury.60
Under our proposal, in the absence of an LTFP, the
United States would not impose AD tariffs. Of course,
even if unfair practices are not distorting steel trade,
the industry could seek safeguard tariffs, provided
that imports are causing serious injury.61
We think that a proposal along these lines would
be attractive to the international community. It of-
fers a new approach to the market-distortion prob-
lem not by gutting the AD statute, but by focusing
the statute on the unfair practices rather than the
unfavorable outcomes.
Domestic Dimension
Pressure on the Bush administration to “do
something” for the steel industry will intensify before
the 2004 presidential election, especially once the
WTO has disapproved the Section 201 tariffs. In the
spirit of our earlier Grand Bargain, we propose that
the US government offer to assume a percentage of
a steel firm’s total long-term legacy obligation
(inclusive of environmental legacy costs) equal to the
percentage of its capacity that the firm is willing to
permanently shutter.62 A firm could also reduce its
legacy liability if it were willing to buy out and
permanently shutter a portion of another firm's
capacity. The capacity bought out would be added
to the purchaser's total capacity for the purpose of
determining the equivalent amount of legacy liability
transferred to the government. This offer should
stand regardless of any merger activity but would
encourage mergers rather than Chapter 7 liquidation.
After a predetermined date, say the end of 2004, the
offer would be pulled from the table. This deadline
would provide an incentive to high-cost steel
producers to reduce their capacity quickly and would
encourage stronger firms to merge with bankrupt
firms before Chapter 7 liquidation. By offering not a
bailout but a buyout, we think the pathological cycle
fostered by the current public subsidy/private
market system would be brought to an end.
58. Under current law, the Commerce Department can find that
imports are sold at LTFV on the basis of predation (exporting to
the United States at prices below the marginal cost of production)
but in practice this clause is rarely invoked. Predation would
obviously be deemed a LTFP under our proposal.
59. Congress has statutorily defined “material injury” as “harm
that is not inconsequential, immaterial, or unimportant”,
language that gives the ITC maximum latitude to find injury.
60. Article 3.7 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement requires
that “A determination of a threat of material injury shall be based
on facts and not merely on allegation, conjecture or remote
possibility. The change in circumstances which would create a
situation in which the dumping would cause injury must be
clearly foreseen and imminent ... [t]he totality of the factors
considered must lead to the conclusion that further dumped
exports are imminent and that, unless protective action is taken,
material injury would occur.” We believe our proposal is WTO-
consistent because if a LTFP is identified, then the threat is
“clearly foreseen and imminent”.
61. In the Doha Round, the United States should work to
generalize this proposal to other industries and negotiate
language in the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement that requires
this alternative methodology.
62. For example, if a steel firm is willing to permanently close
half its capacity (and not sell it to another firm), the government
would take half the firm’s legacy costs.January 2003 PB03-1 20
Appendix A  Calculating the Effect of Product Exclusions
Table A.1 lays out the details of our calculations.
The first step in calculating the effect of product
exclusions is to obtain data on the value of steel
imports subject to tariffs and the value of the tariffs
collected.1 We did so for the steel products subject
to an immediate 30 percent tariff from remedy
countries only.2 The apparent tariff rate is the ratio
of duties to the dutiable value of steel imports for
the first quarter of 2002. Prior to the Section 201
tariffs, this apparent rate was about 1.2 percent.3
Thus, we assume that a 1.2 percent tariff is the norm
for these products and is the tariff that must be paid
even if an exporter enjoys a product exclusion.4
The next step is to calculate the value of steel
imports that are subject to product exclusions in
the post-Section 201 period. To do so, we use a
system of two equations:
Equation (1)    (1.2%+30%)(Included Value) +
(1.2%)(Excluded Value) = Duties
Equation (1)   .312(Vi) + .012(Ve) = D
“Included Value” means imports subject to an
immediate 30 percent tariff increase. “Excluded
Value” means imports that would be subject to an
immediate 30 percent tariff increase if not for product
exclusions. Imports from countries not subject to
Section 201 remedies are not part of any equation
in this appendix.
Equation (2) (Included Value) + (Excluded Value) =
(Dutiable Value)
Equation (2)  Vi + Ve = Vd
By twice substituting equation (2) into equation
(1) and rearranging, we obtain equations for the
excluded value and the included value.
Equation (3)   Ve = [D – (.312)(Vd)] / -.3
and
Equation (4)   Vi = [D – (.012)( Vd)] / .3
Table A.1 shows that in the second and third
quarters of 2002, 46 percent of the steel value
ordinarily subject to a 30 percent tariff increase
entered the United States with a product exclusion.
However, this percentage was declining for several
months (until September) due to a combination of
factors. First, many product exclusions are capped
and exporters may be running into those caps.
Second, the selling price of steel increased during
this period, which encourages steel exporters to
absorb, or “eat”, the Section 201 tariffs. It should be
kept in mind that many product exclusions were
granted in August, which explains the increase in
the share of steel value subject to a product
exclusion. The effect of the August exclusions may
become even more visible in the fourth quarter than
it was in September.
The final step in these calculations is more
tenuous because it requires an assumption about
how steel trade would differ in the absence of Section
201 tariffs. For the period 1996 to 2000, the average
growth in imports of these steel products from remedy
countries both in the second and third quarters
compared to the first quarter was 22.3 percent.5
Demand for steel is generally highest in the second
and third quarters of a year due to the construction
and manufacturing business cycles. We use this
growth rate to project the value of imports of these
steel products if there had been no Section 201
tariffs.6
The value of steel displaced by the 30 percent
tariffs is calculated as the difference between
projected imports and the actual dutiable value. The
safeguard tariffs against these imports, even when
mitigated by the product exclusions, have reduced
1. These data can be obtained from USITC (2002d).
2. The data analyzed in this appendix is a subset of the steel
market and is narrower in scope than the data considered in
the following appendix. The products analyzed in this appendix
are plated steel, hot-rolled flat steel, cold-rolled steel, coated
steel, tin, hot-rolled bars and light shapes, and cold-finished
bars. A list of countries that are not subject to tariff increases
on some or all of these products is provided by the USTR (2002b).
3. The Section 201 tariffs went into effect in late March of 2002,
but we consider the entire first quarter to be “pre-Section 201
tariffs”.
4. This apparent tariff rate is slightly below the 2001 MFN tariff
rates for these products. Apparently, MFN tariffs have been
further phased down in 2002.
5. Steel imports in the third quarter were more erratic than in
the second quarter, thus we weighted each growth rate by the
inverse of the standard error to obtain an average increase in
both the second and the third quarters of 22.3 percent compared
to first quarter levels between 1996 and 2000.
6. This estimate is probably reasonable for 2002 because,
although importers rushed steel into the United States in the
first quarter (prior to the Section 201 tariffs), steel imports in
the second and third quarters should have also been strong in
the absence of Section 201 tariffs due to the domestic supply
shortage.January 2003 PB03-1 21
steel imports from remedy countries in these product
categories by 54 percent. Considering the magnitude
of the product exclusions, it appears that 30 percent
tariffs are sufficient to reduce affected imports by
about 69 percent despite rising steel prices. On a
related note, this fact will make it difficult for the
United States to prove in the WTO that the remedies
are proportional to the amount of injury caused by
imports. Given the rather moderate import “surge”,
tariffs that displace 69 percent of affected imports
appear punitive.
Assuming that steel imports with product
exclusions would have been displaced at the same
69 percent rate if there had been no exclusions, it is
Table A.1 The effect of product exclusions for steel products subject to 30% tariff (in millions of dollars
and percent)
Source: USITC (2002d).
1. Formula used in this calculation is V
e = [D - (.312)(V
d)] / -.3. See page 20 for details.
2. Formula used in this calculation is V
i = [D - (.012)( V
d)] / .3. See page 20 for details.
3. Second and third quarter assumed values of trade in the absence of Section 201 tariffs are calculated by adding 22.3 percent
to first quarter dutiable value. This growth rate is consistent with growth patterns in the second and third quarters relative to the
first quarter between 1996 and 2001 when the second quarter is weighted twice as much as the third quarter due to lower
standard error for mean percent income over the first quarter.
4. The percent decrease in imports subject to a 30 percent tariff increase is calculated by deducting the excluded value from
the base of assumed value of trade in the absence of Section 201 tariffs before dividing the dutiable value displaced by the
adjusted base.
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possible to approximate the real effect of the
exclusions by taking 69 percent of the excluded value.
On this arithmetic, product exclusions are
responsible for about $233 million in additional steel
imports from remedy countries during the second
and third quarters combined. The average price of
these imports is probably between $390 and $333
per ton, which puts the quantity between 600,000
and 700,000 short tons. However, it should be kept
in mind that in the absence of product exclusions,
US steel importers may have resorted to countries
(such as Canada and Mexico) that were totally
excluded from the Section 201 remedies.PB03-1 January 2003 22
A regression model calculates the effect of one
independent variable on a dependent variable,
holding the values of other independent variables
constant. In our model, the dependent variable is
the change in the natural logarithm of the producer
price index for SIC 331.1 The change in the natural
logarithm can be interpreted as the approximate
percentage change in the variable. This is a
convenient property for expressing results.
For this index and the independent variables,
we have a continuous set of data from the second
quarter of 1989 to the third quarter of 2002, although
quarterly observations on some variables are created
by averaging monthly data. The independent
variables include three binary variables to indicate
observations from the second, third, and fourth
quarters of a year and six continuous variables, all
of which enter the model as changes in their natural
logarithms (facilitating interpretation as percentage
changes). The six continuous independent variables
are:
1. The (monthly averaged) leading index for the steel
industry, which includes among its components
the average weekly hours per production worker
in SIC 331, the real value of new iron and steel
orders, the real value of shipments of household
appliances, the S&P stock price index for steel
companies, a measure of automobile sales, the
Appendix B  The Effect of Section 201 Remedies on Domestic Steel Prices
1. SIC 331 is one of the broadest definitions of steel. It roughly
corresponds to the broad definition of steel imports used in this
model which is SITC 67. We use the international classification
system because the units (and thus the unit-values) are more
homogenous. The sample of steel products covered in this
appendix is much broader than the sample considered in
appendix A.
Table B.1 The effect of Section 201 tariffs on the average domestic steel price




Note: The dependent variable is the Change in ln(Producer Price Index - SIC 331). The sample includes quarterly  observations from
1989Q2 to 2002Q3. Monthly data was averaged to create quarterly observations on some variables. The upper and lower bounds
correspond to the 95 percent confidence interval.
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X   1.000  =
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growth rate of the price of steel scrap, an index
of new private housing units, the growth rate of
M3, the Purchasing Manager’s Index, and a trend
adjustment.
2. The (monthly averaged) coincident index for the
steel industry, which includes among its
components the industrial production index for
SIC 331, the real value of iron and steel
shipments, total employee hours for SIC 331, and
a trend adjustment.
3. The (monthly averaged) capacity index for the
steel industry.
4. The quarterly customs value price (unit value) of
imports from remedy countries, which we refer
to as the original price because it is exclusive of
all tariffs (and exclusive of freight and insurance
costs).
5. The quarterly landed duty-paid price (unit value)
of imports from remedy countries, which we refer
to as the final price because it includes safeguard
and other tariffs (as well as freight and insurance
costs).
6. The quarterly quantity of imports from remedy
countries. The quantity and the associated unit
values are for all steel imports under SITC 67,
which includes many steel products that are not
subject to Section 201 remedies due to product
exclusions, country exclusions, or an ITC finding
of no injury to the domestic industry.
The first part of table B.1 shows the results of this
regression. The relevant coefficient for our purposes
is the one for the change in the natural logarithm of
the final price of subject imports, which is 0.687. In
other words, the effect on the dependent variable of
a 1.0 percent increase in the final price of subject
imports holding the initial price (exclusive of tariffs)
constant is about 0.7 percent.
To quantify the effect of the Section 201 tariffs
on domestic steel prices, we undertook a simulation
using the coefficients and predicted values from our
regression model. The next section of table B.1 shows
the behavior of each of the independent variables in






Note: A 0.032 change in the natural logarithm of the Producer Price Index corresponds to a 3.3 percent increase.
The 90 percent confidence interval is a 1.3 to a 5.1 percent increase in price.
Sources: USGS (2002c) for leading index and coincident index; FRB (2002) for capacity index; USITC (2002d) for quantity
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continuous independent variable for the second and
third quarter of 2002 and make the appropriate
changes in the binary variables to produce an
expected change in the dependent variable. Then we
simply set the change in the final price of subject
imports equal to the change in the initial price of
subject imports to “undo” the Section 201 tariff
increase and thereby generate a new expected change
in the dependent variable.
The difference between the two expected values
of the dependent variable is 0.032, indicating the
Section 201 tariffs have increased the average
domestic steel price by 3.3 percent from their first
quarter of 2002 base value. This estimate is
statistically different from zero at the 90 percent
confidence level. Based on the simulation, we are 90
percent confident that the increase in the average
domestic steel price due to the safeguard tariffs is
between 1.3 percent and 5.1 percent.
However, there are several reasons why this
estimate is on the conservative side. First, we only
assess the final price of steel imports from remedy
countries in our simulation. Thus, the apparent tariff
increase (of about 5.3 percent on steel as an
aggregate) understates the actual tariff increase
because only imports that actually enter the United
States “count” in the calculation. If imports that are
prohibited by the Section 201 tariffs had in fact
entered the United States, the apparent tariff rate
would increase.2
Second, we do not manipulate other variables
that are likely to be affected by the Section 201
remedies. For example, the Section 201 remedies may
have caused both the leading index and the
coincident index to increase slightly. If so, the net
effect on domestic steel prices would probably be
positive because the magnitude of the positive
coefficient of the coincident index is larger than the
magnitude of the negative coefficient of the leading
index.
Finally, we do not manipulate the import quantity
variable because we do not think the associated
coefficient is substantive. The coefficient of the import
quantity variable is near zero but positive, which
probably indicates that when the producer price
index rises, steel imports increase simultaneously
(even holding their price constant). Increased foreign
imports are almost certainly reduce the domestic
price. Considering all these caveats, the estimated
3.3 percent increase should be considered the lower
bound of the domestic price impact of Section 201
tariffs.
2. However, if the apparent tariff rate were corrected to reflect
the influence of imports prohibited by the Section 201 tariffs,
the coefficient of the final price of imports would likely decrease
somewhat.January 2003 25 PB03-1
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